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Summary. — Concern about the eﬀects of environmental policies on trade competitiveness
continues to grow in the non-EU Mediterranean regions (e.g., North Africa, the Middle East,
Turkey, Cyprus). While the impact of environmental regulations on exports is widely discussed in
the region, there has been little empirical analysis of how more stringent environmental regulations
might aﬀect exports of key sectors in the future. This paper summarizes the results of six case
studies that estimate the impact of potential changes in environmental regulations on exports from
a key sector in each country. These case studies, which are based on a theoretically consistent yet
empirically tractable modeling approach, suggest that a range of outcomes is likely and depends on
a fairly small set of speciﬁc information. For some of the cases, expected regulatory changes would
probably have little impact on exports, while in other cases the impacts could be substantially
larger. In some countries, the range of potential outcomes is largely due to the magnitude of the
policy change, the importance of various inputs in production, and the lack of information on
international market conditions.  2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Key words — trade and environment, environmental regulations, exports, competition, non-EU
Mediterranean, Cyprus
1. INTRODUCTION
Concern about the eﬀects of environmental
policies on exports continues to grow in the
non-European Union (EU) Mediterranean re-
gions (e.g., North Africa, the Middle East,
Turkey, Cyprus) as ‘‘partnership’’ agreements
with the EU are negotiated and completed. The
Arab League held meetings on the topic in
Cairo, Egypt during September 1999, while the
United National Economic and Social Com-
mission for West Asia (ESCWA) held meetings
on the topic in November 1999 in Beirut,
Lebanon. It is not uncommon for ‘‘trade and
environment’’ committees to exist at the na-
tional level (e.g., in Egypt) and for members of
environmental authorities to assign staﬀ to be
responsible for ‘‘trade and environment’’ (e.g.,
in Lebanon, Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco).
While the potential importance of the basic is-
sue has become well accepted in the region, the
‘‘Expert Group Meeting on Environment and
Trade Issues’’ organized by the United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for Western
Asia concluded that there remains a lack of
capacity in these countries to evaluate the likely
impacts of more stringent environmental regu-
lations on trade in the region (UNESCWA,
1999, p. 12).
To assist with these capacity building needs,
the MedPolicies Initiative of the Mediterranean
Environmental Technical Assistance Project
(METAP) supported the completion of case
studies that analyzed how changes in environ-
mental regulations (actual and proposed) might
aﬀect exports of speciﬁc sectors of the economy
in Cyprus, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia,
and Turkey. 1 Edited working paper versions
of the case studies can be found in HIID
(2000), with the drafts for Cyprus, Jordan,
Syria, and Turkey available in English and the
drafts for Morocco and Tunisia available in
French.
Given that the case study reports include
substantial amounts of additional country-
speciﬁc detail, the primary purpose of this pa-
per is to explain and synthesize the main results
obtained from the set of six case studies. It is
hoped that this presentation contributes to the
existing debate on trade and environment in
three ways. First, we provide additional infor-
mation on a range of actual regulatory issues
that these countries are facing. These case
studies show that the issues are ubiquitous, but
often depend on fairly speciﬁc and often tech-
nical issues related to a speciﬁc subsector of the
economy. Second, we show how policy analysts
in developing can use a fairly simple method-
ology to begin to analyze these topics quanti-
tatively and in a timely fashion to inform the
policy debate. Finally, by looking at the results
of the six country case studies as a whole, we
begin to see how the magnitude of the eﬀects
depends on the details of the case.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction
to the case studies, which include a range of
policy issues being driven by natural resource
scarcity issues (e.g., water in Cyprus and Tu-
nisia), environmental quality issues (water
pollution in Morocco and Turkey), and envi-
ronmental risks and product standards in ex-
ports markets (Syria and Jordan). Section 3
uses the Cypriot case study on irrigation water
policy to introduce the partial equilibrium
modeling approach used in the studies and to
show in detail how the methodology is applied.
Section 4 then summarizes some of the core
results for the remaining case studies. Section 5
concludes.
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2. CASE STUDY TOPICS
The case study topics were chosen to include
a range of sectors that are important for jobs,
output and export earnings for the countries.
The topics were also chosen to reﬂect a wide
range of environmental issues––domestic re-
source scarcity issues, domestic environmental
quality issues, and environmental risk issues in
foreign markets––that these sectors are ad-
dressing now and/or are likely to have to ad-
dress in the future. Regarding sectors, three
case studies focus on agricultural markets: po-
tato exports from Cyprus, fertilizer exports
from Jordan, and date and citrus exports from
Tunisia. The other three case studies focus on
textile and leather markets: cotton-based tex-
tile product exports from Syria; cotton-based
textiles product exports from Morocco; and
tanned-leather exports from Turkey. A brief
introduction for the case study topic for each
country follows, with the countries focused on
agricultural markets presented ﬁrst followed by
the textile/leather countries. 2
(a) Cyprus––A domestic resource scarcity issue
The case study for Cyprus analyzes the im-
pact on potato exports of higher prices for ir-
rigation water. While representing only a small
share of total GDP in Cyprus, agriculture re-
mains important to the overall economy as an
export earner. Agricultural commodities and
various processed food products account for
35–40% of total exports, and fresh potatoes
alone have accounted for half or more of the
total value of agricultural exports since the
early 1990s. The EU is the important foreign
market for potatoes, mainly during the spring
season when new potatoes produced in Cyprus
are imported tariﬀ-free into the EU.
Cyprus has suﬀered chronic water shortages
for decades, and agriculture––potato farming
in particular––has probably added to the stress
on water supplies. Essentially all potato pro-
duction relies on irrigation, with irrigation ac-
counting for 70–75% of water use on the island.
Farmers receive irrigation water at a highly
subsidized rate from the Water Development
Department. The average charge for irrigation
water in 1998 was $0.13/m3, which is estimated
to equal 34% of full delivery costs. Due to
water scarcity, government-supplied irrigation
water supply was reduced substantially reduced
in 1998 and totally eliminated for potato
growers in the southeastern coastal region.
With negotiations beginning in 1998 for ac-
cession to the EU, full accession will require
among other things that Cyprus adopt EU
environmental legislation. This could be prob-
lematic, especially in the case of existing water
policies that highly subsidize irrigated agricul-
ture. For example, the EU’s framework direc-
tive on water policy calls for full cost recovery
for water supplied to all users, including
farmers. In short, the price of irrigation water
should be high enough to cover all of the fol-
lowing: O&M (operations and maintenance)
costs; repair costs; loan payments; and a fund
for improvements and extensions. On average,
these costs are perhaps $0.40 m3 for govern-
ment water supplies although they are much
higher for newer water supply projects. In other
words, with an average rate of $0.13/m3, prices
in Cyprus would need to increase roughly 200%
to about $0.40/m3 to become consistent with
the water directive.
Given water scarcity issues in general in
Cyprus, and the probable increase of water
prices to farmers in the future, the Cypriot case
study evaluated the impact of higher prices for
irrigated water on production and exports of
potatoes. While a 200% price increase anytime
in the future is unlikely to be based on dis-
cussion between the case study team and gov-
ernment oﬃcials in Cyprus, the case study
evaluated the impact on production and ex-
ports of three price changes (20%, 40%, and
60%).
(b) Tunisia––A domestic resource scarcity issue
The case study for Tunisia estimates the im-
pact of higher irrigation water costs on exports
of dates and citrus. Agriculture in Tunisia ac-
counts for about 14% of total GDP. As with
other countries in North Africa, the manage-
ment of critical and limited water resources
remains a key issue for economic growth and
development of the economy. The cost of water
to various sectors in the economy will surely
rise in the future, either due to deterioration of
supplies leading to increased access costs or
policy induced increases in water resource
costs.
Not surprisingly, however, producer associ-
ations basically oppose water cost increases to
industry. The main concern is that any water
cost increases will hurt their competitiveness,
with a resulting reduction in exports and em-
ployment and an increase in imports.
THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ON EXPORTS 1059
To evaluate this relationship between water
costs and key exports, the Tunisian case study
focused on the impact of higher water costs on
fruit production and exports, and speciﬁcally,
dates and citrus. For reference, fruit exports
were about 73.2 million dinars in 1995 (about
1.1 dinars per $1 US), which represented about
13.2% of total agricultural and food exports. Of
total fruit exports, dates (fresh and dried) ac-
counted for about 70% and citrus (mainly or-
anges) accounted for about 22%.
(c) Jordan––An issue of product standards in
export markets
The case study for Jordan estimates the im-
pact of removing cadmium from phosphoric
acid (P2O5), which is then used in the produc-
tion of fertilizers that are exported. The mining
sector––mainly phosphate and potash––is an
important sector of the Jordanian economy,
which accounted for 7.5% of the GDP, about
7% of the industrial labor force, and about 36%
of total exports as of 1996.
While there are currently four main phos-
phate mines in Jordan, the large and relatively
new Shidiya mine has known reserves of 1.5
billion tons (annual mined output is less than
nine million tons). As of 1996, about 97% of
total fertilizer output (phosphate, potash, and
manufactured fertilizers using these materials)
were exported with a value of about US$542
million. For reference, rock phosphate is ex-
ported directly and is used in the production of
phosphoric acid, which in turn is a key input in
the production of other fertilizers (e.g., diam-
monium phosphate (DAP)). The Jordanian
Phosphate Mining Company (JPMC), which
holds monopoly mining rights for phosphate
mining that are renewed every 30 years,
exported almost $359 million in 1996, split
roughly 50=50 between phosphate rock and
manufactured fertilizers. 3
Main export markets are in the EU and Asia,
and Jordanian fertilizer exports are likely to
face product standard issues in some of these
markets in the future related to cadmium and
radioactivity content. Both of these potentially
hazardous materials are passed along in the
production of phosphoric acid and then DAP.
European countries and other locations have
lowered the allowable cadmium content in fer-
tilizer products over the past years, with the
most stringent requirements found in Norway,
Finland, Sweden and Switzerland.
The phosphate that is currently extracted
from the Shidiya mine and to be extracted in
the future has high enough cadmium levels to
be of potential concern for the JPMC. Since the
current strategy of the JPMC is to focus pro-
duction of the phosphate rock in the Shidiya
mine, the removal of cadmium will probably
become a management concern in not-too-dis-
tant future.
The total removal of cadmium from rock
phosphate directly is considered technically
impractical and uneconomic. But, there are
several processes being developed for the re-
moval of cadmium from phosphoric acid, in-
cluding: cocrystalization of cadmium with
anhydrite (estimated cost is US$8 per ton),
precipitation of cadmium with sulﬁdes (esti-
mated cost is US$15 per ton), ion-change resins
(estimated cost is US$35 per ton), and solvent
extraction (estimated cost is US$26 per ton).
These costs do not include any domestic dis-
posal cost associated with managing the solid
waste (e.g., the cadmium). With phosphoric
acid prices in the range of $219 per ton in 1997,
these additional cadmium removal costs could
represent a 2.5–10% increase in the cost of
phosphoric acid used as an input in fertilizer
production.
(d) Morocco––A domestic environmental
quality issue
The case study for Morocco estimates the
impact on production and exports of textile
products if new water eﬄuent standards for the
sector were developed and enforced. As back-
ground, textiles are a key sector of the Mo-
roccan economy, accounting for almost 30% of
all industrial enterprises located mainly in Ca-
sablanca, Fez, Rabat, Settat and Marrakech.
The sector of almost 1,400 facilities involves
four related production segments (spinning,
weaving, dying, and garment assembly). As of
1996, total textile exports were about 13 billion
dirhams, with almost 70% of total exports
destined for Europe. Garments, however, ac-
counted for over 55% of the value of total
production and almost 81% of total textile ex-
ports (about 10.4 billion dirhams as of 1996).
The government of Morocco is currently in
the process of developing water eﬄuent stan-
dards for various industries in the country, with
biological oxygen demand (BOD) being iden-
tiﬁed as a likely pollutant to be regulated in the
textile sector (mainly due to eﬄuents in the
dying stage). Existing estimates in Morocco of
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total BOD5 levels in water eﬄuent are between
26,000 and 58,000 tons per year, with the textile
sector accounting for perhaps 3,900–8,700 tons
per year. Based on existing estimates of BOD5
control costs per ton, the Moroccan case study
considers the impact on production and exports
of textiles of creating and enforcing modest
BOD5 eﬄuent standards on the textile sector.
(e) Syria––An issue of product standards in
domestic and export markets
The case study for Syria estimates the impact
of the existing Syrian ban on the use of car-
cinogenic azo dyes on the production and ex-
port of textile products. Syria produces and
exports cotton, cotton yarns, cotton fabrics,
and garments. The dying process in the pro-
duction of yarns and fabrics is one of the more
pollution-intensive components of the textile
industry, mainly in terms of water eﬄuents. In
1996, Syria banned the importation (and de
facto use) of carcinogenic azo dyes. While the
ban has been enforced, the original motive for
the ban is not clear. The government could
have taken the action to maintain continued
access for the country’s exports to the German
market, which banned the use of azo dyes in
about 1994, although there was no EU-wide
azo dye ban in either 1994 or 1996. If Syrian
policy changed to maintain market access for
exports to Germany, this case study provides a
good example of how a product standard in an
export market (azo-free textiles products) ef-
fectively becomes a process standard in the
producing country. Of course, the government
may also have banned imports (and domestic
production) due to concerns for the citizens
health in the country.
While dyes can be applied to either yarn or
fabric, the Syrian case study focused its analysis
on the dying process in the production of fab-
rics (considered relatively more important in
Syria). In this case, the azo dye ban forced
domestic fabric producers to use more expen-
sive substitute dyes. Since more domestic fabric
is consumed within the country, mainly as an
input in the garment industry, the impact of
azo dye ban on garment exports is evaluated.
(f) Turkey––A domestic environmental quality
issue
The case study for Turkey estimates the im-
pact on production and exports of leather
products if existing water eﬄuent standards
were actually enforced on the sector. Turkey is
one of the world’s larger producers of leather.
The sector, which contains about 1,200 facili-
ties, is divided between formal sector enter-
prises in organized industrial zones (about
80%) and small-scale facilities (20%). As of
1995, the sector accounted for about 1.8% of
manufacturing output, almost 4% of total ex-
ports, and about 5% of employees covered by
the country’s social security system. About 75%
of Turkish leather exports are to the EU, with
44% of total exports going to Germany alone.
Leather production is pollution intensive.
From raw hide and skin preservation to soak-
ing, unhairing, liming, and tanning, a range of
water pollutants are generated including: total
suspended solids, BOD, chemical oxygen de-
mand, pH, phosphorus, total chromium, chro-
mium þVI, nitrogen, oil and grease, and
phenol.
While Turkey has already adopted water ef-
ﬂuent standards for tanneries that were mod-
eled in part from German eﬄuent standards,
existing available data suggest that actual ef-
ﬂuent levels substantially exceed standards. As
a result, while producers in organize industrial
zones have waste water treatment facilities,
such facilities either are not used or are not
capable of handling the eﬄuent load form the
tanneries. Such a situation in principle is not
consistent with the customs agreement between
the EU and Turkey.
3. APPLYING THE METHODOLOGY
USING THE CASE STUDY FOR CYPRUS
The eﬀects of more stringent environmental
regulations, such as higher water prices, on
production and exports can be discussed quite
easily in a simple demand and supply context.
Three situations or possibilities are considered
in the case studies: a basic partial equilibrium
analysis; an extension that allows for ﬁrm-level
ineﬃciency improvements to be induced by the
regulatory change; and an extension that allows
for equilibrium price adjustments in export
markets. Each situation is developed in turn,
and the information from the Cypriot case
study is used to show in detail how the meth-
odology is implemented.
(a) The ‘‘basic’’ partial equilibrium approach
Consider the simple market situation in
Figure 1, where S0S0 is an initial supply
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schedule for potatoes in Cyprus, p0 is a con-
stant export price for potatoes, BB represents
domestic demand in Cyprus, and E0 ¼ Y 0  B0
is the existing level of exports of potatoes to the
EU. In Figure 1, domestic policy changes (i.e.
higher water prices) increase production costs
and, therefore, shift domestic supply from S0S0
to a new level S1S1. Given a ﬁxed price at
p0, domestic production falls from Y 0 to Y 1
and exports fall from E0 ¼ Y 0  B0 to E1 ¼
Y 1  B0. 4
While in principle it is possible to estimate
directly a reduction in past production and/or
exports due to past changes in some environ-
mental regulation, the data needed to estimate
such relationships are diﬃcult to obtain in
many developing and transition economies. In
such countries, however, the past is not as rel-
evant as the future. The public policy concern,
for example regarding water pricing in Cyprus,
focuses on how policy changes in the future
might alter production and exports in the fu-
ture.
To analyze these forward-looking questions
quantitatively, Larson (2000) shows how to use
some microeconomic foundations to decom-
pose supply shifts in Figure 1 into separate
components that can be easily understood.
Some of these components can be calculated
directly, while others need to be estimated and/
or approximated depending upon data avail-
ability and purpose of the analysis. With this
decomposition, policy scenarios can be devel-
oped to simulate trade eﬀects if such environ-
mental policy changes were implemented. The
results of this policy analysis can provide rele-
vant information in a timely fashion to on-
going environmental and trade policy debates
in developing countries.
Since the Cypriot case study and the Med-
Policies case studies in general used the Larson
(2000) approach, the main logic of this ap-
proach is summarized here. The methodologi-
cal overview provided here is simply intended
to help the reader understand and evaluate the
results presented for the case studies. The pre-
sentation and notation used here is perhaps
easier to follow than in the original article.
Moreover, all of the empirical analysis dis-
cussed in this paper is new and was not con-
tained in Larson (2000).
Larson (2000) begins by assuming that ﬁrms
(e.g., the potato producers in Cyprus) try to
minimize costs and maximize proﬁts within the
context of competitive markets. As a result, if
some input X (water) becomes more costly due
to a policy change (higher water prices), the
links between proﬁt and costs functions can be
used to estimate the resulting shift in the sup-
ply.
The basic notation is:
X the regulated input used by some in-
dustry (water in the Cyprus analysis)
w the initial regulated input price (water
price)
Figure 1. Environmental regulations raise costs, reduce production and reduce exports.
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K other inputs (e.g., fertilizer, seeds, la-
bor)
r ﬁxed prices of other inputs
Y output (spring season potatoes in the
Cyprus analysis)
f ðX ;KÞ a production function relating inputs
to output, with Y ¼ f ðX ;KÞ
p the output price.
With the above notation and the assump-
tions that producers minimize costs and maxi-
mize proﬁts within the context of competitive
markets, the proﬁt function is p ¼ pðp;w; rÞ
and the cost function is C ¼ Cðw; r; yÞ, where y
is any reference level of output.
Using the envelope theorem (Hotelling’s
Lemma for the proﬁt function and Sheppard’s
Lemma for the cost function), we also know
that Y ¼ Y ðp;w; rÞ is the proﬁt-maximizing
supply function for potatoes, X ¼ X ðp;w; rÞ is
the proﬁt-maximizing water demand function,
and X c ¼ X cðw; r; yÞ is the cost-minimizing in-
put demand function for any level of output y.
When y is evaluated at the proﬁt-maximizing
supply level Y, we also know that X ðp;w; rÞ ¼
X cðw; r; Y ðp;w; rÞÞ.
For policies that aﬀect a speciﬁc input (such
as water), let some initial regulatory situation
be denoted as R0, and let the input price be
denoted as w0 ¼ wðR0Þ based on this regulatory
situation. For example, initial water prices are
wðR0Þ ¼ $0:13 m3 for the Cypriot case study.
If water policies change from R0 to R1, then the
new price becomes w1 ¼ wðR1Þ. As a result, the
environmental regulatory change from R0 to R1
implies a price change dw ¼ w1  w0, which in
percentage terms can be written as dw=w0 ¼
ðw1  w0Þ=w0. As noted above, three scenarios
are evaluated in the Cypriot case study based
on dw=w0 ¼ 20%, 40%, and 60%. Based on
these policy scenarios, the goal here is to eval-
uate (calculate, or approximate, or estimate)
the shift in supply, dY ¼ Y 1  Y 0, from this
policy-induced change in the price of the reg-
ulated input (water).
To begin to evaluate this shift in supply, the
symmetry of the Hessian of p, can be used to
show that:
oY
ow
¼  oX
op
¼  oX
c
oy
oY
op
6 0 ð1Þ
where oY =ow shows the shift in potato supply
from a change in the water price, oX=op
shows the negative of the eﬀect of higher potato
prices on water demand. These two expres-
sions are equal (oY =ow ¼ oX=op) because the
Hessian matrix of second-partial derivatives of
the proﬁt function is symmetric in prices. The
last expression in (1) makes use of the fact that
X ðp;w; rÞ ¼ X cðw; r; Y ðp;w; rÞÞ.
The result in (1) can be rewritten in elasticity
form as:
gyw ¼
oY
ow
w
Y
¼  wX
C
 
C
pY
 
gypg
c
xy ð2Þ
where gyw ¼ ðoY =owÞðw=Y Þ is the percentage
change in potato supply for a 1% increase in
water prices; wX=C is water cost as a share of
total production costs; C=pY is simply costs
over revenues; gyp ¼ ðoY =opÞðp=Y Þ is the per-
centage change in potato supply for a 1%
change in potato price, and gcxy ¼ ðoX c=oyÞðY =X Þ is the percentage change in cost-mini-
mizing level of water demand for a 1% increase
in output level. 5
Deﬁning h ¼ ðpY  CÞ=C as the percentage
of proﬁts over production costs, which can be
rearranged to yield C=pY ¼ 1=ð1þ hÞ, and
deﬁning Sx ¼ wX=C as the water cost share, Eq.
(2) can be written more simply as:
gyw ¼ SX
1
1þ h
 
gypg
c
xy ð3Þ
For some policy changes that increase the
cost of the regulated input by any percentage
dw=w0 discussed above, the cross-price elastic-
ity in (3) can be used to project the percentage
change in output as:
dY
Y 0
¼ gyw
dw
w0
ð4Þ
where Y 0 and w0 are the initial input price and
output level before the policy change.
Finally, potato exports are equal to produc-
tion minus domestic consumption (E ¼ Y  B),
so that the change in exports is dE ¼ dY . In
percentage terms, the change in exports from
the water policy change can be estimated as:
dE
E0
¼ dY
Y 0
1
ðE0=Y 0Þ ð5Þ
The relationships in Eqs. (3)–(5) show that
the impact of more stringent environmental
policies on exports in this simple partial equi-
librium world depends on ﬁve speciﬁc pieces of
information:
––the supply elasticity with respect to output
price, gyp;
––the regulated input’s cost as a share of to-
tal costs, SX ;
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––the proﬁtability of the industry, repre-
sented by the term 1=ð1þ hÞ;
––the returns to scale of the industry (see
footnote 2), represented by the input de-
mand elasticity (cost-minimizing) with re-
spect to output level, gcxy ; and
––the actual regulatory impact on input
costs, dw=w0.
Table 1, under the heading ‘‘basic informa-
tion,’’ provides the initial values for these six
pieces of information used in the Cypriot study.
First, supply elasticities are not that diﬃcult to
estimate if data are available, and it is common
practice in international trade studies to bor-
row elasticities from the existing literature to
develop elasticity estimates for simulation and
policy analyses (see, e.g., Sullivan, Wanio, &
Roningen, 1989). Even though potatoes are a
key crop in Cyprus, there has been surprisingly
little analysis of supply response in the sector.
As a result, it was not possible to borrow a
potato supply elasticity with respect to price
from some previous study. Rather than borrow-
ing an elasticity from some other country, the
Cyprus case study used annual price and quan-
tity information from government statistics to
estimate a supply elasticity of gyp ¼ 0:15. 6 This
elasticity estimate is used in Scenario 1 reported
in Table 1. Given the lack of prior knowledge
regarding this elasticity, however, Scenario 2
reported in Table 1 considers a larger elasticity
of gyp ¼ 1:00. The importance of precision of
such numbers will be discussed after the basic
information and results are presented.
Second, based on reported data from the
HIID (2000, p. 222) water costs are on average
about 5% of total potato production costs.
Third, regarding proﬁtability, reported data
from the HIID (2000, p. 222) suggest that, on
average, spring season potato production is
highly proﬁtable, with h ¼ 0:72 so that 1=ð1þ
hÞ ¼ 0:58. This 72% level of proﬁts above costs
seems large, especially since the reported cost
information includes variable costs, ﬁxed costs,
and returns to family labor. To consider the
implications of lower proﬁtability, Scenario 2
assumes a proﬁt rate of 20%, so that h ¼ 0:20
and 1=ð1þ hÞ ¼ 0:833.
Fourth, there is no direct information re-
garding returns to scale in potato production.
Intuitively, returns to scale and supply elastic-
ities are related. Sectors with close to constant
returns to scale have large supply elasticities,
while ﬁrms with more decreasing returns to
scale have smaller supply elasticities. As a re-
sult, for Scenario 1 in Table 1, the relatively
Table 1. Basic information, parameter assumptions, and results for the Cypriot case study
Notation Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Basic information
Output Y Potatoes Potatoes
Regulated input X Water Water
Supply elasticity gYp 0.150 1.000
Input cost share SX 0.050 0.050
Proﬁtability factor 1=ð1þ hÞ 0.580 0.833
Returns to scale factor gcXY 2.000 1.100
Basic model results
Cross price elasticity from Eq. (3) gYw 0.009 0.046
Policy scenario: a 60% increase in water price ðdw=wÞ  100 60.000 60.000
Percentage change in potato production from Eq. (4) dY =Y 0.525 2.767
Export share of total production E=Y 0.800 0.800
Percentage change in potato exports from Eq. (5) dE=E 0.656 3.458
Including export price adjustments
Domestic demand elasticity gBp 0.500 1.000
Domestic consumption as share of total production B=Y 0.200 0.200
Export demand elasticity gDp 6.000 10.000
Exports as a share of total production E=Y ¼ D=Y 0.800 0.800
Export price elasticity from (7) gpw 0.002 0.005
Final supply elasticity with respect to the input price from (8) XYw 0.008 0.041
Final export elasticity with respect to the input price from (8) gEw 0.010 0.050
Final % change in output dY =Y 0.509 2.466
Final % change in exports dE=E 0.624 3.007
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small supply elasticity of gyp ¼ 0:15 is combined
with relatively strong decreasing returns to
scale at gcxy ¼ 2:00. For Scenario 2 in Table 1,
the larger supply elasticity of gyp ¼ 1:00 is
combined with closer to constant returns at
gcxy ¼ 1:10.
Fifth, regarding the policy scenario, a 60%
increase in water price is evaluated in Table 1.
While it was fairly easy to identify a policy-
relevant price increase for the Cyprus case
based on discussions with the Ministry of Ag-
riculture and others in Cyprus, it is noted here
that this piece of information is often the most
diﬃcult and potentially confusing piece of in-
formation needed for the analysis. On the one
hand, average notions of ‘‘strictness’’ used in
trade and environment literature, such as in
Tobey (1990), are not precise enough to eval-
uate actual changes in policies on production
incentives and trade. On the other hand, engi-
neering-like estimates of costs of meeting new
regulations tend to overestimate actual costs
and do not take into account the fact that
governments regularly subsidize ﬁrms to un-
dertake such actions.
Returning to Table 1, under the heading
‘‘Base Model Results,’’ the results for the Sce-
nario 1 analysis suggests that a 60% increase in
water prices to irrigated potato farmers would
change potato production by 0.53% and ex-
ports by 0.66%. For Scenario 2, however, the
same policy change would lead to a 2.77%
reduction in production and a 3.46% reduc-
tion in exports. While the trade impact for
Scenario 1 are minor, the 3.5% reduction in
exports in Scenario 2 is probably large enough
to be considered a ‘‘big’’ impact.
The usefulness of this case study analysis for
Cyprus, and the other countries as well, is the
ease with which scenarios can be developed and
analyzed. Ranges of policy options are usually
under discussion at any point in time, and the
various groups involved in the policy process
may have diﬀerent opinions regarding key pa-
rameters and assumptions of any analysis.
With Table 1 set up in any standard spread-
sheet program, ‘‘what if’’ questions can be
asked during meetings with diﬀerent stack
holders involved in (and impacted by) policy
changes. Better information can be incorpo-
rated on the spot, and the discussion can focus
on the pieces of information that are considered
to be the least precisely known. As discussed in
the Cypriot case study, for example, a price
increase of only 20% is perhaps a likely ﬁrst
step in the process of raising water prices. With
just a 20% water price increase, exports are
calculated to fall by only 0.22% for Scenario 1
and about 1.15% for Scenario 2. Given that
Scenario 1 is probably a better representation
of the current situation in Cyprus, a modest
water price increase would have negligible im-
pacts on the level of production and exports of
potatoes.
(b) Including eﬃciency improvements
If environmental regulations increase an in-
put price, as discussed above, companies may
have an incentive to increase the eﬃciency with
which the input is used. In general, such eﬃ-
ciency improvements act to oﬀset some of the
impacts on the sector of the input price increase
due to environmental regulations (see, e.g.,
Porter, 1990). This eﬃciency eﬀect can be de-
scribed as a simple shift in supply functions as
outlined in Figure 2. In Figure 2, the direct
impact of higher input prices on production
and export is a shift back in the supply function
from S0S0 to S1S1 as in Figure 1. As a second
impact, however, eﬃciency improvements as-
sociated with the input price increase act to
shift out the supply function to S2S2 with new
production levels Y 2 with exports E2 ¼ Y 2  B0.
Thus, eﬃciency improvements act to mitigate
some of the adverse impacts on exports of some
environmental policy change. Appendix A
provides additional details on how to include
eﬃciency improvements into the analysis.
While a possibility in general, the Cypriot
case study did not include eﬃciency improve-
ments in the analysis of water pricing. Existing
information from the Ministry of Agriculture,
Natural Resources and the Environment (see
HIID, 2000, p. 10) suggests that modern, water
eﬃcient irrigation technologies are already used
on 95% of the irrigated area in the country.
Opportunities for further eﬃciency improve-
ments in water use are limited even if water
prices rise.
(c) Diﬀerentiated products and export price
adjustments
As noted in Larson (2000), there are two
simple reasons why export prices may adjust as
domestic production shifts in response to en-
vironmental regulatory changes. First, by deﬁ-
nition, changes in export supply from a ‘‘large
country’’ will inﬂuence international prices for
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that product (Van Beers & Van den Bergh,
1996). Second, products may be diﬀerentiated
by country of origin (e.g., Armington, 1969),
among other reasons. Given that Cypriot po-
tatoes are considered to be of very good quality
in the EU and, as a result, have sold at pre-
mium prices compared to other competitors
(see, HIID, 2000, p. 221), this notion of diﬀer-
entiated products seems highly relevant for the
Cyprus case study. As a result, shifts in do-
mestic production and export supply may aﬀect
the price received for exports (see, Dervis, de-
Melo, & Robinson, 1989, p. 225).
Figure 3(a) for the domestic market and (b)
for the export market show how to include
export price adjustments into the analysis, with
the sector now facing a ‘‘downward sloping’’
export demand schedule DD in (b). As envi-
ronmental policy changes lead to shifts in do-
mestic supply from S0S0 to S1S1, for example,
Figure 2. Eﬃciency improvements can reduce costs, increase production and increase exports.
Figure 3. Including export price adjustments.
WORLD DEVELOPMENT1066
export prices adjust in Figure 3(b) from p0 to
p3. With this export price increase, domestic
production increases to Y 3, domestic demand
falls to B3, and the overall change in exports is
from E0 ¼ Y 0  B0 at price p0 to Y 3  B3 at
price p3.
For additional notation for Case 3, let
D ¼ DðpÞ represent export demand as a func-
tion of price (e.g. EU demand for Cypriot po-
tatoes), and let B ¼ BðpÞ represent domestic
demand as a function of domestic price. As-
suming the export market clears where DðpÞ ¼
Y ðp;w; rÞ  BðpÞ, the equilibrium export price
in local currency will be p ¼ pðw; rÞ.
After taking the total diﬀerential of the
equilibrium condition with respect to p and w,
the impacts of higher input costs due to more
stringent environmental regulations on price p
can be written as:
gpw ¼
gyw
gBp
B
Y  gyp þ gDp EY
" #
ð6Þ
where gDp is the elasticity of export demand
with respect to the product’s price, gBp is the
elasticity of domestic demand with respect to
price, B=Y is the share of domestic consump-
tion in total production, and E=Y is the share of
exports in total production. In eﬀect, the elas-
ticity in (6) shows how much of the regulatory-
induced input price increase is passed along to
consumers in the export market.
Writing the expanded form of the supply
function as Y ¼ Y ðpðw; rÞ;w; rÞ and of the ex-
port supply function as E ¼ Y ðpðw; rÞ; w; rÞ
BðpÞ, the basic result for Case 3 is that:
Xyw ¼ gyw þ gypgpw and
XEw ¼ Xyw 1ðE=Y Þ  gBpgpw
ðB=Y Þ
ðE=Y Þ
ð7Þ
where the overall supply elasticity with respect
to input price wðXywÞ is simply the Case 1
elasticity gyw plus the own-price elasticity
of supply times the export price elasticity
with respect to the input price deﬁned above.
The export supply elasticity, XEw, now takes
into account supply changes and consumption
changes induced by the policy. 7 In Table 1
under the heading ‘‘including export price ad-
justments,’’ for Scenario 1 it assumed that do-
mestic potato demand is fairly inelastic (0.5),
while export demand is fairly elastic (6).
Again, for policy analysis purposes, there are
not to the authors’ knowledge existing studies
that report estimates of these elasticities for
Cyprus. 8 Thus, Scenario 2 is also developed
with larger demand response both in the do-
mestic (1.0) and export markets (10). In
general, lower demand response allows more
of the regulatory costs to be passed along to
consumers in both the domestic and interna-
tional market, while higher larger demand re-
sponse allows less of the cost to be passed
along.
Using these Scenarios, the results for Sce-
nario 1 shows that gpw ¼ 0:002, so that a 60%
increase in water prices to irrigated potato
farmers would increase export prices by only
0.12%. This minor increase in price, due in part
to the minor production impact, mitigates some
of the production and export decline. For
Scenario 2, even though demand is more re-
sponsive to price in both markets, the ﬁnal ef-
fect on prices is larger (gpw ¼ 0:005), due mainly
to the higher original supply impact described
in Figure 1. With a 60% increase in water
prices, export prices increase by 0.30% and
exports fall by 3.007% overall. Thus, this
relatively minor export price increase is large
enough to moderate some substantial amount
(18%) of the original reduction for the basic
model.
4. A SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR THE
SIX COUNTRIES
The above methodological discussion and
application in the Cyprus case study provides
an introduction to the logic used in the case
studies. For all case studies, information for the
basic model was developed. This information,
which is summarized for all countries in Table
2, was simply the starting point for the analysis.
In most cases, input cost shares, estimates of
regulatory-induced cost changes, and proﬁt-
ability were obtained from government sources
and/or direct discussion with industry leaders.
Information on supply elasticities and returns
to scale were more diﬃcult to obtain, as noted
above. For each case study a group of scenarios
were developed to explore a reasonable range
of possible outcomes.
Table 3 summarizes the range of impacts
obtained for the six case studies. As noted in
Column one of Table 3, information for the
three agricultural studies (Cyprus, Jordan, and
Tunisia) is provided ﬁrst, followed by the
studies focused on textile and leather sectors
(Morocco, Turkey, and Syria).
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Besides water pricing, the Cypriot case study
also included an analysis of the impacts of
higher fertilizer prices on potato production
and exports. Table 3 for Cyprus shows that
higher fertilizer costs (due to EU nitrate policy
for groundwater protection) would have minor
impacts on potato production and exports. The
main reason is that the existing irrigation
technology would allow for the easy adoption
of fertilizer application through the drip irri-
gation systems (fertigation). This technology
switch involves substantial eﬃciency improve-
ments in the use of fertilizers, which from Table
3 could imply almost no impact on production
and exports. For this case, it is possible to ob-
serve eﬃciency improvements in the use of
fertilizers due to ‘‘fertigation’’ large enough to
oﬀset completely the fertilizer price increase,
thereby leading to minor production increases
(an empirical example that is consistent with
the so-called Porter hypothesis).
For Jordan, fertilizer exports (DAP) could be
aﬀected by the additional costs of removing
cadmium, depending on actual removal costs in
the future. Since phosphoric acid (P2O5) ac-
counts for about 25% of the costs of producing
DAP, higher P2O5 costs are important. If low
cost approaches are viable, so that P2O5 pro-
duction costs only rise by about 2.5%, and if
such costs are passed along to the DAP pro-
duction stage, the impact on production and
exports of DAP fertilizer would be minor
(perhaps an export decline of 0.3%). If removal
costs are actually higher, so that P2O5 price
rises by perhaps 10%, then the fall in produc-
tion and exports could be about 1.3%. There is
substantially uncertainty, however, about sup-
ply response in the fertilizer industry. Table 3
shows that exports could fall by about 6.5%
with high-cost cadmium removal, higher supply
response, and decreasing returns to scale due to
capacity constraints.
For Morocco, the proposed increase in
BOD control costs would have a minor impact
on textile production and exports, and there
is little variation in the outcomes. The logic
of this outcome is clear. BOD control costs
are currently almost zero, perhaps between
0.09% and 0.15% of production costs. At
the same time, the proposed BOD eﬄuent stan-
dard policy would involve minor increases in
BOD control costs. As a result, minor in-
creases in water control costs, due to the initi-
ation of modest water eﬄuent control policies
in the textile sector, would probably have mi-
nor impacts on overall production levels and
exports.
Caution is needed, however, in the interpre-
tation of the Moroccan case study because the
study assumes that capital costs for BOD con-
trol would be subsidized by the government,
while the industry would only pay operating
and maintenance costs. If the relevant policy
option was more stringent BOD eﬄuent stan-
dards along with the private sector paying both
investment and operating costs, it would be
easy to envision a future where eﬄuent control
costs reached 2–5% of total production costs.
Using the average cost model discussed in
Appendix A, such cost increases could reduce
exports by about 5–11%. Thus, this Moroccan
study emphasizes that environmental policies
per se are not the issue; rather it is necessary to
be clear on both the stringency of the policy
Table 2. Base information for country studies (all numbers rounded to two decimal places)
Cyprus Jordan Syria Morocco Tunisia
Output Y Potatoes Potatoes Fertilizers Garments Textiles Dates Citrus
Regulated input X Water Fertilizer P2O5 Dyes Water Water Water
Supply elasticity gYp 0.15 0.15 0.50 1.90 2.00 1.00 0.50
Cost share SX 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.75 0.00a 0.16 0.07
Proﬁtability factor 1=ð1þ hÞ 0.58 0.58 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Returns to scale factor gcXY 2.00 2.00 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.50 1.50
Export share of output E=Y 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.30 0.80 0.27 0.53
Eﬃciency improvements gqw 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.10 0.50 0.10 0.10
Domestic price elasticity
of demand
gBp 1.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.00
Export price elasticity of
demand
gDp 6.00 6.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
a For Morocco, the water eﬄuent cost share is only 0.1% of production costs, which due to rounding is noted as 0.00
in Table 2.
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and the allocation of ﬁnancial responsibility for
complying with the policy.
The range of results for Tunisia, Turkey, and
Syria show that, for some countries, a rather
wide range of potentially substantial impacts
could occur depending on speciﬁc pieces of in-
formation and proposed policy changes. For
example, from Table 3, higher water costs for
irrigation in Tunisia could have some impor-
tant impact on production and exports. For a
50% increase in water costs, the analysis sug-
gests that exports could fall between 2% and
4% for citrus and 14–26% for dates. This dif-
ference depends on the fact that water has a
higher cost share for dates as compared to cit-
rus and the case study suggests that supply re-
sponse is less for citrus as compared to dates.
The large range of negative impacts on
leather exports for Turkey is driven by the
rather large cost change associated with the
proposed policy change (equivalent to 2–6% of
total production costs), the minor share of
production that is exported (25% of production
exported), and the rather large supply response
used in the analysis based on previous studies.
The Turkish study also emphasizes the impor-
tance of being able to pass along some of the
production cost increase through higher output
prices. For example, the high-cost policy sce-
nario (water cost equal to 6% of total costs) is
estimated to reduce exports by 45% if export
price is ﬁxed. With international price adjust-
ments, based on elasticities reported previously
in the literature, this result falls from 45% to
7%. While 7% is still rather large in absolute
terms, it is substantially smaller than with no
price adjustments. With the lower-end cost in-
crease of 2% of total production costs, this
impact with international price adjustments is
2.3%. 9
For Syria, the policy to ban the use and im-
portation of azo dyes raised dye costs by about
35% (i.e., the price diﬀerential for azo-free
substitutes). With dyes accounting for about
20% of fabric production costs, the case study
estimates that the domestic fabric price would
rise between 4% and 9% depending on fabric
supply response, domestic fabric demand (as an
input into garment production) and returns to
scale in fabric production. Given that fabrics
represent about 75% of garment costs in Syria,
this fabric price increase is estimated to reduce
garment production by 4–10%. Given that
about 30% of garment production is exports,
the percentage drop in exports is substantially
larger (9–22%).
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5. FINAL COMMENTS
The impact of environmental regulations on
exports depends on the details of the situation
and, as a result, it makes little sense to make
sweeping generalizations that ‘‘environmental
regulations have no impact on competitive-
ness’’ on the one hand or that ‘‘more stringent
regulations will hurt competitiveness.’’ As the
MedPolicies case studies show, the impacts of
environmental policy changes on exports de-
pend on several clearly identiﬁed pieces of in-
formation, including: input cost changes due to
the regulatory change; the share of the regu-
lated inputs in total costs; proﬁt rates in the
sector; supply response and returns to scale
in the sector; domestic and export demand
elasticities; and possibilities for eﬃciency im-
provements. It is the combination of these
factors that determine the impact of environ-
mental policy changes on exports.
In sum, environmental policy changes will
have smaller impacts on production and ex-
ports when policy changes: (i) lead to small cost
changes; (ii) aﬀect inputs that are a small por-
tion of overall costs; (iii) aﬀect sectors with
limited supply response; and (iv) aﬀect sectors
that have relatively less elastic export demands
in terms of own price. Impacts of new policy
changes on exports will be larger when the
opposite is true.
For all country case studies, much of the
needed information on supply and demand
elasticities (with respect to output price) for
various sectors are essentially missing. This
lack of understanding of the basic workings of
these economies is symptomatic of the lack of
data and resources and perhaps interest in the
creation of such information. Even for potatoes
in Cyprus, which are the key agricultural export
for the country, information on such elasticities
are absent. Fortunately, while precise estimates
may not be available, reasonable initial esti-
mates of all the individual pieces of information
for the partial equilibrium approaches used
here can be based on common sense, existing
information (especially for cost shares and
proﬁt rates), and existing estimates in the lit-
erature for related sectors or similar sectors in
other countries. Sensitivity analysis can then be
used to discuss how the estimated impacts
change depending on the detailed assumptions
used.
While perhaps the most diﬃcult to estimate,
the ability to make improvements in the eﬃ-
ciency with which regulated inputs are used
will probably be one of the key factors in the
future. Where ﬁrms are able to innovate and
become more eﬃcient in low-cost ways, the
impacts of more stringent environmental poli-
cies on exports should be minor (and vice
versa).
NOTES
1. The overall MedPolicies Initiative included 13 non-
EU countries in the Mediterranean region. MedPolicies
supported case studies on three topics (trade and
environment, air pollution, and environmental liability
and privatization). This paper focuses exclusively on the
trade and environment case studies.
2. A more in-depth discussion of the issues can be
found in the complete country-speciﬁc case studies
reported in HIID (2000).
3. By products of phosphoric acid production include
various types of air pollution in the evaporation process
as well as solid waste known as phosphor gypsum, which
contains some levels of radioactivity.
4. See Krutilla (1991), Anderson (1992), Smith and
Espinosa (1996) for additional simple graphical over-
views of this topic. See Van Beers and Van den Bergh
(1996, 1997), Esty and Geradin (1998), Jaﬀe, Peterson,
Portney, and Stavins (1995) for more complete intro-
ductions to the topic.
5. This last term in (2) is directly related to the concept
of returns to scale of the production function. Since Y =X
is the average product of water in potato production
(APX ), and since oX c=oy ¼ 1=½of =oX  is just one divided
by the marginal product of water (1=MPX ), gxy ¼ APX=
MPX , which must be greater than one with decreasing
returns to scale (and equals one with constant returns to
scale).
6. To estimate this elasticity, annual production and
price data were obtained from government statistics to
estimate a simple log–log supply function, in which case
the estimated parameter on output price is also the
supply elasticity. The details and data used for this
estimation are available directly from the Cyprus Case
Study Leader.
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7. Eq. (7) is the simple extension of Case 1 assuming no
eﬃciency improvements. To complete the calculations,
the percentage change in production and exports can be
approximated by multiplying the elasticities in (7) by the
policy induced-change input costs.
8. The lack of such information should not be too
surprising in many situations. For example, Abler and
Shortle (1997, p. 70) conclude the following for elasticity
information in agriculture: ‘‘In the US, although esti-
mates are more plentiful, there are many large disagree-
ments between studies. The bottom line is that EU
policymakers are basically operating in the dark, while
US policymakers are not too far ahead.’’
9. Note that the original Turkish case study used a
somewhat diﬀerent modeling approach. For comparison
purposes with the other case studies, the basic informa-
tion for Turkish case study used here is reported in Table
2, which are used to estimate the impacts reported in
Table 3. The results are essentially the same here as
reported in the Turkish study.
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APPENDIX A.
A.1. Adding eﬃciency improvements to the
base model
To include the possibility that stricter envi-
ronmental policies induce eﬃciency improve-
ments in the production process, the following
additional notation is needed:
f ðqX ;KÞ the technical production function re-
lating inputs to output so that Y ¼
f ðqX ;KÞ;
q an input eﬃciency parameter; and
z ¼ qx the ‘‘eﬀective’’ amount of the input
used.
With this new form of the production func-
tion, the proﬁt function becomes p ¼ pðp;w=
q; rÞ, where the term w=q is the eﬀective price of
the regulated input. Using essentially the same
process as outlined with the basic model, the
ﬁnal eﬀect of any regulatory change that in-
creases w depends on how this eﬀective input
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price changes. As shown in Larson (2000), the
crossprice elasticity for Case 2 (i.e. Case 1þ
efficiency improvements) becomes:
Wyw ¼ ð1 gqwÞgyw ðA:1Þ
which is just the crossprice elasticity from Eq.
(3) in the text, and gqw shows the percentage
increase in the eﬃciency of input use induced
by a change in the price of the input. In general,
when environmental policy has a ‘‘good’’ im-
pact on either input quality or incentives to use
the input more eﬃciently, it is possible that gqw
is positive. If gqw > 1, the expression in (A.1) is
positive, which allows for the possibility that
more stringent environmental regulations could
induce more exports. While gqw is a useful
conceptual idea, how to calculate or estimate
this number is not that clear in most circum-
stances. As a result, it is probably best to use
this idea as a potential eﬀect that can be in-
cluded in additional sensitivity analyses related
to the Case 1 results.
Both eﬃciency improvements and export
price adjustments can be easily included into
the analysis simultaneously. The elasticity Wyw
from Eq. (A.1) can be simply substituted for
gyw in Eqs. (6) and (7) in the text to include
eﬃciency improvements into this analysis as
well.
A.2. The ‘‘average cost’’ case
It is also possible that environmental regu-
lations cannot be attributed to some speciﬁc
input or inputs. In such situations, it is possible
to evaluate the impact of regulations that in-
crease average production costs by some
amount ‘‘m’’ (e.g., $8 per unit of output). In
this case, for example, let MðR0Þ ¼ 0 be the
initial regulatory situation and let MðR1Þ ¼ m
represent the regulatory cost increase due to
more stringent regulations. As a result, dM ¼
m, and m=C is the percentage increase in pro-
duction costs due to the environmental policy.
For perspective, Tobey (1990) deﬁnes pollution
intensive sectors as those sectors with annual
pollution abatement costs driven by environ-
mental policies are greater that 1.85% of total
production costs (i.e. where m=C > 0:185).
In such situations such as with end-of-pipe
pollution control technologies it may be diﬃ-
cult to attribute environmental regulatory cost
changes to speciﬁc inputs. In such circum-
stances, there may be data or information
available on how some regulatory change is
likely to aﬀect average production costs, in
which case the cost function can be written as
C ¼ Cðw; r; yÞ þ my, where m represents an in-
crease in average production costs due to the
regulation. In this case, the supply function
shifts from Y ¼ Y ðp;w; rÞ without the regula-
tion to Y ðp  m;w; rÞ with the regulation. For
this case, a similar process as followed in Sec-
tion 2 can be used to show that the percentage
change in output is simply:
dY =Y 0 ¼ gYp
mY 0
C
1
1þ h ðA:2Þ
In this average cost increase case, it is just
necessary to know the basic supply elasticity,
the percentage increase in costs due to the
regulation, and an estimate of the existing
production cost increase (m) due to the envi-
ronmental policy change. Given this change in
output, the change in exports can be calculated
directly as above. For reference, the base in-
formation used in the Turkey case study is:
gYp ¼ 0:15, mY =C ¼ 0:06, C=pY ¼ 0:58, E=Y ¼
0:80, gBp ¼ 1:00, and gDp ¼ 6:00.
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